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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

State of. Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent

vs.
MAX FLOYD STOCKTON,

Defendant and Appellant

PRELIMINARY STATE.MENT
Defendant appeals from the verdict of the jury
finding defendant guilty of attempt to commit burglary
in second degree.
The record on appeal is in two volumes one of
which consists of the pleadings, minute entries and
similar papers. All references to this volume are designated by the letter "R". The other volume which is
separately numbered is a transcript of the testimony
and proceedings at the trial. References to this volume
are designated by the letter "T".
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The charge against defendant Stockton is "attempt
to commit burglary in the second degree" in that on
the 5th day of February, 1956, he then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and burglariously in the
night time of said day forcibly attempt'ed to break and
enter a certain building located in Huntsville, Weber
County, Utah, occupied by Jesperson's Mercantile with
the intent to commit larceny therein. (R. 1).
The State's evidence showed that an unidentified
person or persons atte1npted to gain illegal entry to
Jesperson's Mercantile on the day in question. (T. 43,
45). That a car bearing a license number BY 782 was
seen in the vicinity of the Jesperson's 1\Ierca:ntile at the
time in question (T. 27) and that defendant Max
Stockton was apprehended in the company with Robert
D·ean Carter and Lee Goddard in a car driven by Lee
Goddard and bearing license number BY 782. (T. 35).
That when the car was searched a padlock was found
which was identified by State's witnesses as having been
used in locking J·esperson's .Mercantile. (T. 36, 43).
That Deputy Sheriff A. R. Covieo claimed to have had
a conversation with Lee Goddard out off the presence
of defendant Stockton at the sheriff's office after the
arrest of the three defendants in which conversation
and at which tin1e Goddard purportedly repeated the
conversation to Covieo wherein Stockton, Carter and
Goddard agreed that Carter and Goddard would take
the blame for what had happened in Huntsville that
night. (T. 84). In the late afternoon of February 4,
1956, Stockton, Carter and Goddard 'vere seen in Hunts~
ville, Utah. (T. 29. 30).
2
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The evidence of defense was that Max Stockton
on th'e night of February 4th, 1956, while walking across
the street at Washington Boulevard and 25th Street
in Ogden, Utah, was hailed by two acquaintances, Robert
Dean Carter and Lee Goddard and was asked by Goddard if Stockton wanted to go for a ride with Carter
and Goddard (T. 53). Stockton got in the car with
Carter and Goddard, and Goddard drove the car up
Ogden Canyon to Huntsville, Utah where Goddard
stopped the car a half block from Jesperson's Mercantile. (T. 53, 74). Carter and Goddard got out of the
car, Goddard took a suit case out of the car and
Carter and Goddard walked out of the sight of Stockton.
Defendant Stockton remained in the car. (T. 54). Defendant Stockton testified that he did not know where
Carter and Goddard had gone nor what they had been
doing while away from the car, (T. 75), but that upon
leaving the car and Stockton, Goddard and Carter had
mentioned going to see a girl, (T. 74, 75) and that they
would be back in a little while. (T. 54).
After being away from Defendant Stockton for approximately fifteen minutes (T. 54) Carter and Goddard
returned to the car and after driving around Huntsville
for a short time during which an observer noted the
license number on the car driven by Goddard the three
defendants drove down Ogden Canyon and were apprehended in the canyon some miles away from the scene
of the crime by A. R. Covieo, Chief Deputy of the Weber
County Sheriff's office. In th'e car with the defendants
was a suit case containing various tools ( T. 37) and
parts of a padlock that was later identified by State's
witnesses as having been cut off a hasp on Jesperson's
Mercantile.
3
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Not one of the State's witnesses saw defendant Max
Stockton at the scene of the crime nor could they identify
him as having had any part in attempting to gain entry
to Jesperson's Mercantile. (T. 17, 24, 28, 29). Defendant
Stockton and L·ee Goddard denied having the conversation reported by Deputy Covieo wherein the three
defendants agreed that Carter and Goddard were to
take the blame for what had happened in Huntsville
that night. (T. 66, 68, 75, 76). Lee Goddard denied
making such a statement to Deputy Covieo. (T. 66).
Defendant Stockton denied having any knowledge of
any attempt to break into the Jesperson's Mercantile
or with having had any part in the planning or commission of the offense. (T. 74, 75, 76, 77). Goddard
testified that the job was the result of the planning and
effort of he and Carter, and that it was never discussed
with Stockton and Stockton did not participate in any
way in the commission of th'e crime. (T. 55, 56).
Only defendant Stockton was charged and tried
for this crime.
STATEMENT OF POINTS TO BE ARGUED

I.
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AND FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE STATE'S
CASE:.

II.
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AND FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE· DEFEND4
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ANT AT THE CONCLUSION OF DEFENDANT'S
CASE.
III.
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING INTO EVIDENCE OVER THE OBJECTION OF DEFENDANT'S COUNSE:L A CONVERSATION BETWEEN
DEPUTY A. R. COVElO AND ONE OF THE CODEFENDANTS OUT OF THE PRESENCE OF THE
DEFENDANT AND WHICH RELATED TO THE
COMMISSION OF THE CRIME.

IV.
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY AS REQUESTED IN DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS NUMBERED ONE TO SIX.

v.
THAT THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO
SUSTAIN THE CONVICTION.

ARGUMENT

1.
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AND FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT IN FAVOR. OF THE DEFENDANT
AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE STATE'S CASE.
The elemental law in a criminal case is contained
in section 77-31-4 of the Utah Code Annotated 1953.
"The defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved
5
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and in case of a reasonable doubt his guilt is
satisfactory shown is entitled to an acquital."
This basic rule has been reiterated in the case law
of our State. In State vs. McCune, 51. Pac. 818, 16
Utah 170, this Court has stated:
"In order to convict, the prosecution 1nust
prove its case and _~establish guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt".
The defendant submits to this Court that at the
conclusion of the state's case there 1vas no evidence
that defendant Max Stockton had attempted to commit
burglary. The evidence merely showed that ·some unidentified person or persons had attempted to enter
Jesperson's Mercantile at the time in question. That a
car bearing license number BY 782 was seen in the
vicinity and later stopped in Ogden Canyon and that
the defendant was in that car in company with Dean
Carter and L'ee Goddard. A padlock was found in
the car that was claimed to have been cut off the door
of Jesperson's Mercantile.
There was nothing is the state's evidence to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant Stockton was
guilty of the crime charged. No one saw hin1 at the
scene of the crime. Although the state presented many
witnesses, not a one clai1ned that he sa1v Max Stockton
make any attempt to break and enter Jepperson's Mercantile. He was not apprehended with any stolen lnerchandise in his possession. No one claim=ed that the
afore1nentioned padlock was in defendant's possession.
The glaring defect in the State's case was that it had
eo1npetely failed to prove all of the elements of the crime
charged as required by the la,Y.
6
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State vs. Prince, 65 Utah, 205, 284 Pac. 8, enumerates
the elements of which an attempt consists.
(a) The intent to commit crime.
(b) The performance of some act towards the conlmission of the crime, and
(c) The failure to consumn1ate its commission.
If these are the elements that constitute an attempt
to commit crime. It would follow that if any of these
elements were missing the crime had not been committed.
There is no evidence that defendant Stockton had
the (a) intent to commit the crim·e or (b) performed
some overt act towards the commission of the crime.
Thus two of the three of the required elements of the
crime charged are not proven by the State, and for this
reason and for the reason that it was not proven beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the
crime charged it was incumbent upon the Court to assume the responsibility of taking the case from the jury
and granting defendant's motion to dismiss.

n.
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AND FOR DIRECTED
VERDICT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT AT THE
CONCLUSION OF THE DEFENDANT'S CASE.
At the conclusion of defendant's case defendant renewed a motion to dismiss and the motion was denied.
(T. 87, 88).
The def·endant testified that he was invited to go
for a ride with Dean Carter and Lee Goddard, and in
7
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con1pany with these persons, with Lee Goddard driving,
arrived in Huntsville, Utah, in the late hours of February 4th, 1956.
Goddard stopped the car a half block from the
Street intersection that the Jesperson's Mercantile was
located on.
Goddard and Carter got out of the car. Goddard
took a small suit case from the car, and when defendant
Stockton inquired as to where they were going, he was
informed that they were going to see a girl. Defendant
Stockton remained in the car alone for about thirty
rninutes. Goddard and Carter returned and drove the
car away. Stockton testified that he did not realize that
an unlawful act had been committed until the trio were
apprehended by the Deputy Sheriff. Defendant Stockton
testified that he had no part in planning the commission,
and was not informed that Goddard and Carter were
going to attempt to commit burglary at this time and
place.
Lee Goddard as a witness for defendant Stockton
readily admitted his own complicity in the crime, but
denied that Stockton had any part whatsoever in its
planning or commission, and further denied that Stockton had 'ever been informed of the plan of Carter and
Goddard.
In the cornmission of all crimes under the laws of
our State it is necessary that intent be shown to commit
a crime. In State vs. Prince, Supra, it was stated that
an intent to coinmit the act was the s~econd element of
an attempt to conunit a crime. State vs. 111cCune, Supra,
holds:
8
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"When the intent is the gist of the offense
that intent should he sho,vn by such evidence as
uncontradicted will authorize it to be presumed
beyond a reasonable doubt."
Defendant subn1its to this Court that in the first
place the State has shown no evidence Stockton had the
requisite intent to com1nit the crime, and in the second
place the testimony of defendant Stockton and Lee
Goddard absolutely negatives such an intent. U pan
such evidence it cannot be said the intent to commit the
crime was ~tncontradicted to a point that it could be presumed beyond a reasonable doubt.
As pointed out in Underhill's Criminal Evidence,
4th Edition on page 21.
"All the circumstances as proved must be
consistent with each other and they ought to be
taken together as proved. Being consistent with
each other and taken together they must point
surely and unerringly in the direction of guilt."
The explanation made by both defendant Stockton
and Lee Goddard abnegates any clear and convincing
presumption that Stockton could be guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The ~evidence fails to point "surely and
unerringly' in the direction of guilt. Stockton could
have been and was along just for the ride. Who can
say on the basis of the evidence that beyond reasonable
doubt defendant Stockton was aware of the plans of
Carter and Goddard, helped planned the burglary and
aided in its co1nmission. The State was without evidence
to show this to the extent required by law. The testiInony of defendant Stockton and Lee Goddard point
the way to defendant's innocence.
9
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III.
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTINGIN~eo EVIDENCE OVER THE, OBJECTION OF DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL A CONVERSATION BErPWEEN DEPUTY A. R. COVElO AND ONE OF THE
CO-DEFENDANTS OUT OF THE PRESENCE OF
DEFENDANT AND WHICH RELATED TO THE
COMMISSION OF THE CRIME CHARGED.
The conversation objected to is found on page 83
of the transcript commencing with line 19 and is as
follows:
Do you have any recollection with regarddid you have a conversation with Lee Goddard relative
to his stating that they were willing to take the blame.
Q.

A.

Yes sir.

Q. Will you tell us what that conversation was f

A. I talked with Lee Goddard about this burglary
1n Huntsville.
Mr. Handy: Just a moment may I voir dire the witness your honor.
The Court : Yes.
Voir dire exan1ination by Mr. Handy:

Q. Was this conversation, Officer Covieo m the
presence of Mr. Stockton.
A.

No sir.

Mr. Handy: I object to it your honor as being hearsay.

10
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Argument
rrhe Court: I'll overrule the objection as an exception to the rule. You may testify.
(To witness) Now do you remember the last question'
A. Yes, I had a conversation with Lee Goddard
pertajning to Max Stockton. Goddard told me just before-well just after I had stopped the car at the time
he was getting out of the car he stated the conversation
between Lee Goddard and Dean Carter and Max Stockton
was, should Lee Goddard take the blame along with
Dean Carter and leave Max Stockton out of it because
of the ~eriousness of it and Max Stockton said yes, that
he did want them to take the blame because of the seriousness of the trouble he was already in.
It must be noted here that tlre conversation objected to occured at a time when the defendant and
Carter and Goddard had been arrested and were in the
custody of the Sheriff in the County jaiil. Such a statement would be hearsay and inadmissable in evidence
against the defendant Stockton.
In People vs. Roberts, (California,) 254 Pac. 2nd
501, 504, the same issue was raised, the Court there held:
"The evidence of Syas' (co-conspirator) contradictory extra judicial statements was admissable against him, both because it tended to prove
that he had in fact associated with and worked
for Roberts and because it tended to impeach
Syas. Such evidence however, would be inadmisable hearsay as to Roberts. (The defendant)
(People vs. Gillaland, 1940) 39 Cal App'eal 2nd,
250, 262, 103 Pac. 2nd, 179 :
11
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(Fiswick vs. United States (1946) 329 lT. S.
211, 217, 67 S. Ct. 224, 91 L. Ed. 196. ("Confession or admission by one co-conspirator ajte1: he
has been apprehended is not in any sense a frwrtherence of a criminal enterprise. It is rather
a frustration of it) * * * * (A conspirators) admissions were therefore not admissable against
his erstwhile fellow conspirators.)"

The holding of the Oklahoma Courts is as follows:
Parnell vs. State, Oklahoma 250 Puc. 2nd, 474, 478,

479.
"We think it may be said as a general rule,
the arrest of co-conspirators may be said to effectively preclude any further concerted actions
and ordinarily puts an end to the conspiracy and
accordingly any statement by a co-conspirator
out of the presence of his other co-conspirators
made qfter his arrest and confinenlent in jail
would be hearsay and inadmissable."
Leeth vs. State, Oklahoma 230 Pac. 2nd. 942, 951.

" * * * * * statements made by a co-defendant
after the termination of the conspiracy between
the defendant and co-defendant, if any existed,
are not admissable against defendant on trial,
and where such statements are clearly prejudicial their admission is reversable error."
Ramsey vs. State 250 Pac. 936, Schuh cs. State,
280 Pacific 869. [~nderhill on Cri1ninal Evidence
3rd Edition, Section 719, page 936.
Montana rule is the san1e and is found in State vs.
Keller Montana 246 Pac. 2nd 81'7, 822.
The Utah (~ase of State vs. !:3intpson 236 Pac. 2nd
107'7, 1078, in regard to a conversation of a co-defendant
out of the presl\nce of the defendant had this to say:

12
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'~There can be as there \vas here, a conspir-

acy between persons to engage jointly in othwr
criminal offenses and if this fact is shown by
independent evidence, the statements of any of
the conspirators, made in furtherance of the
com1non criminal purpose is unquestionably admissable against all."
According to the above Utah case there must be
-independent evidence of other criminal offenses, and
only if the state1nents were 1nade in furtherance of the
co1n1non criminal purpose are the statements admissable.
In the instant case any conspiracy was at an end
inasmuch as all three defendants were arrested and
incarcerated at the time the statements were alleged
to have been made.
In State vs. Simpson, supra, the California. case of
People vs. Suitor 111 Pac. 2nd 23, 31, was quoted from
in support of its holding and this statement is found
in that case.
"Of course it must reasonably appear that
such acts were committed in furtheranee of the
common design of the conspiracy."
In the instant case it was denied by both defendants
Stockton and his co-defendant Goddard that there was
any common design to take the blam~e from Stockton and
place it solely upon the shoulders of Carter and Goddard.
The conversation in regard to this matter is even denied.
In State vs. Erwin, Utah 120 Pacific 2nd, 285, it was
held:

"* * * * extra judicial declarations of each
conspirator may be used against his co-conspirator, but not to prove existence of the conspiracy.
13
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That fact must be proved by other evidence. and
in a conspiracy case each accomplice is a co-conspirator with· all the others and thus the existence
of the conspiracy may not be proved by the e:rtra
judicial declarations of a co-conspirator. J>roof
of the existence of the conspiracy is an essential
element of the corpus delecti in the case and
therefore may not be proved by the extra judicial
declarations of an acomplice. See Wigmore on
Evidence 2nd Edition 1048, 1078, 1079. Terry cs.
United States 7 Fed. 2nd 28, State ~cs. Inlou·
141 Pac. 530 (Utah), Looney vs. Bingham Dairy
75 Utah 53, 282 Pac. 1030, 73 A. L. R. 427.

Thus in the case at bar the existence of the conspiracy whether to burglarize the Huntsville Mercantile
or to shift the blame for the offense is a matter that
may not be proved by the extra judicial declarations
of a co-conspirator and the conversation allegedly had
between deputy Covieo and co-defendant Goddard after
the apprehension and arrest of the three defendants
and which was had out of the presence of the defendant
Stockton, would be hearsay and inadmissable.

IV.
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO
INSTRUCT THE, JURY AS REQUESTED IN DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS NUMBERED ONE TO SIX.
Instruction No. 1 is as follo,Ys :
"You are instructed that if you find fron1 the
evidence that although defendant Max Floyd
Stockton, drove to the scene of the crilne "~ith
Lee Goddard and Dean Carter he did not directly

14
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connnit an act constituting a crin1e, nor did he
aid or abet the commission of the crnne, you
will find the defendant not guilty."
lt was error to refuse this instruction for the reason
that there was evidenc(_. that defendant Stockton did
not directly commit an act constituting a crime and
did nothjng to plan or aid in its commission or to put it
in another way there is no evidence that defendant
Stockton did any act that would constitute a crime nor
is th•ere any evidence that he planned or aided in the
commission of this crime.
See 14 American Jurisprudence, Page 812, Section

63.

"A person is not liable for the acts of another
merely because he is present when it is committed".
Requested Instruction No. 2 is as follows :
"You are instructed that an attempt to commit a crime consists of three elements (a) the
intent to commit the crime (b) the performance
of same act towards the commission of the crime
and (c) failure to consummate its commission,
and if you find from the evidence that anyone or
more of the above elem'ents is missing from the
case under consideration you will find the defendant not guilty."
An attempt to commit a cri1ne consists of three
elements which are enumerated in the above instruction.
It is obvious that if any of the elernents is missing
that the crime would not be complete. The instruction
requested was a correct instruction and was in conformity with law and the facts of the case. See State
vs. Prince 75 Utah, 205, 284 Pac. 108.

15
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Requested Instruction No. 3 is as follows :
"You are instructed that in order to constitute an attemept to commit a crime it is essential
that the defendant with the intent of committing
the particular crim'e do some overt act adapted
to, approximating, and which in the ordinary
and likely course of things will result in the conlmission thereof. Therefore the act must reach
far enough towards the accomplishment of the
desired result to amount to the eommencen1ent of
the consummation. The act must not be 1nerely
preparatory.
There was no evidence that defendant Stockton
with an intent to commit the crime charged did an overt
act towards its accomplishment. The instruction is a
correct expression of the law to be applied to the facts
in evidence. See 14 American Jurisprudence, Section
68, Page 816.
Requested Instruction No. 4 is as follows :
You are instructed that if an attempt to conlmit a crime be voluntarily and freely abandoned
before the act is put in process of final execution
there being no outside cau~e pron1pting such
abandonment then this is a defense and if you
find from the evidence that the defendant voluntarily abandoned an attempt to burglariz;e
Jesperson's Mercantile in Huntsville, Utah, on
February 5, 1956, then you will find the defendant not guilty.
The evidence presents the question of whether or
not the attempt to commit the crin1e was in fact abandoned voluntarily before the act was put in process of
final execution. The evidence sho,vs clearly that
if there was an abandonment it "·as voluntary. It is
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obYious that any attempt to burglarize was abandoned
because Carter and Goddard could not force an entry
into the building.
The requested instruction was in conformity with
the facts and applicabl'e law. See fJ7 harton's Criminal
Law, Volume 1 Section 226, page 306.
Requested Instruction No. 6 is as follows:
You are instructed that in order for a person
to be an accomplice he must in some manner
knowingly and with criminal intent, aid, abet,
assist or participate in the criminal act, and you
are further instructed that the mere presence of
the defendant at the scene of the crime combined
with knowledge that crime is about to be committed or a mental approbation while the will
contributes nothing to the doing of the act will
not of its'elf constitute the defendant an accomplice.
None of the States witness could identify defendant Stockton as taking any part in the commission of
the crime. The only evidence presented against defendant Stockton is that Stockton was in the car with
Carter and Goddard when the car was stopped in Ogden
Canyon some miles from the scene of the crime. The
instruction was a correct presentation of the law as
found in State vs. Fertig, Utah, 233 P2, 347, 349 and
the evidence was such as to warrant the giving of the
instruction and it was error not to do so.

v.
THAT THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO
SUSTAIN THE CONVICTION.
Point V should be considered in conjunction with
Points I and II.
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In the case at bar, the only evidence that connects
the defendant Stockton with the commission of the
crime charged is that he was in the company with Robert
Dean Carter and Lee Goddard when their car was
stopped in Ogden Canyon, some miles from the scene of
the alleged crim'e and the alleged, uncorroborated, hearsay statements of an accomplice, that Stockton helped
plan the crime.
In State vs. Laub, 131 Pac. 2nd, 805 four defendant~
Cannon, Laub, Reber and Pectol were convicted of
grand larceny in that they killed and stole a beef belonging to Charles Foster.
The Facts showed that defendant Cannon was with
the other defendants at the place near where the beef
was slaughtered. That the other defendants \Vere observed to have blood on their hands and clothing at or
near the place. All of the defendants made false statements about their actions and the type of meat in their
poss'ession.
The conviction of defendant Cannon was reversed
on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence to
sustain the conviction, and in so doing the Court said:
"While the State's evidence is circun1stantial
such evidence may be just as conclusive or even
more so than direct evidence, but the prosecution
still has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty or stated
another way the prosecution 1nust not only sho"T
by a preponderance of evidence an offense \vas
committed and that the alleged facts and circumstances are true, bnt they nl ust also be such
facts and circun~stances as are incornpatible upon
any reasonable hypothesis other than defendant's
guilt.
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People vs. Scott, 10 Utah 217, 37 Pac. 335,
See also State vs. Burch, 100 Utah, 414, 115 Pac.
2nd 911, State vs. Crawford, 59 Utah 39, 201
Pac. 2nd 1030.
As pointed out in Underhills
Criminal Evidence 4th edition, page 21, all the
circumstances as proved must be consistent with
•
each other and they are to be taken together as
proved. Being consistent with each other and
taken together they must point surely and unerringly in the direction of guilt * * * * *" Hence
if two reasonable hypothesis are pointed out by
the evidence and one of them points to the defendant's innocence it would then be difficult
to see how any jury could be convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt.

* * * * *He (Cannon) was not with th~e other
three defendants when they came from the woods,
he did not have any blood on him nor did he stay
~th the other defendants so that the court or
jury could infer that he help·ed bring the carcass
to the truck. The uncontradicted evidence is
that he went with the Trumans to help them load
wood and did not rejoin the other defendants
until they were ready to leave for home. The
only evidence which points to his guilt is that he
made false statements about trading pine nuts
for the meat in Nevada and he took part of the
meat. This is not sufficient to uphold his conviction. This is not a charge of conspiracy and
there is no evidence that he in any way aided in
or planned the commission of the crime. The
conviction of Cannon is not sustained by the
evidence and must be reversed."
If the evidence in tlre above case was insufficient
to sustain the conviction of defendant Cannon, who was
seen with the other defendants at the scene of the
crime, and who was found in possession of some of
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the stolen meat, and who made false statements about
possession of part of the stolen meat, how could it be
said in the case before the court that the evidence was
sufficient to sustain the conviction of defendant Stockton when he was not seen at the scene of the crime, but
was only found in the presence of the other two codefendants some miles from the scene of the crime. In
addition to the above evidence against Stockton, it must
be pointed out that the State attempted to prove defendant Stockton's complicity in the crime by the alleged
conversation with Goddard with Deputy Covieo, which
has been dealt with above, and which cannot be said to
add sufficient evidence toward the conviction. This
also, is not a charge of conspiracy and there is no evidence that he in any way aided in, or planned the commission of the crime. The conviction should be reversed
because it is not sustained by the evidence.
In addition to the above argument, it should be
pointed out that it could have been only on the basis
of the alleged conversation between Goddard and Deputy Covieo that the jury convicted defendant Stockton.
Utah Code Ann. 1953, 77-31-18
A conviction shall not be had on the testin1ony
of an accomplice, unless he is corroborated by
other evidence, which ·in itself and ·zrithout the
aid of the testimony of the acconzplice tends to
connect the defendant with the connnission of the
offense; and the corroboration shall not be sufficient if it merely shows the co1n1nission of the
'
.
offense or the eircun1stances thereof.
If the co-defendant Goddard, did have the conver~ation with Deputy Covieo that the officer claiu1ed and
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if such a conversation is admissable in evidence against
the defendant, was there 'other evidence' corroborating
this testimony which in itself and without the aid of,
tends to connect the defendant Stockton with the comlnission of the offense t The only other evidence was
the fact that Stockton was with the other defendants.
State 'CS. Spencer, Utah, 49 P. 302 states that there
n1ust be corroboration of such material facts as constitute the necessary elements of the crime charged.
Can it be said that the fact that Stockton was with
Carter and Goddard was a material fact constituting a
necessary element of the crime 1 Not according to State
vs. Prince, supra. See also State vs. Collett, Utah, 58
P. 684.
State vs. Coroles Utah, 277 P. 203 holds that unless
the corroborative evidence implicates the accused in
the offense charged and is inconsistent with his innocence that it is the duty of the trial court to direct a
verdict for the defendant. Se'e also State vs. Cox, Utah
277 P. 972.
State vs. Butterfield, Utah, 261 P. 804 holds that
the corroborative evidence is insufficient if it merely
casts a grave suspicion on the accused. Se'e also State
L:s. Simpson, Utah, 236 P2 1077.
Obviously, the fact that defendant Stockton was
found in the company with Carter and Goddard could
do no rnore than cast a grave suspicion upon Stockton
and the testimony of Goddard implicating Stockton has
not been corroborated and the evidence against the defendant is insufficient to sustain the conviction.
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CONCLUSION
The conviction of the defendant Stockton should
be reversed for the reason that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the conviction; that the Court erred
in admitting into evidence hearsay evidence in the form
of a conversation between Deputy A. R. Covieo and one
of the co-defendants, which conversation was had out
of the presence of the defendant and which related to
the commission of the crime charged, and that the failure
of the Court to give to the jury defendant's requested
instructions numbered one to six, withheld from the
jury the correct law to be applied to the facts in evidence.
Respectfully submitted
GEORGE B. HANDY
Attorney for defendant
and appellant
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